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Being Virtuous and Prosperous: SRI’s Conflicting Goals 
 









ABSTRACT. Can SRI be a means to make investors both virtuous and prosperous? This paper argues that there 
can be significant tensions between these goals, and that SRI (and indeed all investment) should not allow the pursuit of 
maximizing investment returns to prevail over an ethical agenda of promoting social and economic justice and 
environmental protection. The discourse on SRI has changed dramatically in recent years to the point where its 
capacity to promote social emancipation, sustainable development and other ethical goals is in jeopardy. 
Historically, SRI was a boutique sector of the market dominated by religious-based investors who sought to 
invest in accordance with the tenets of their faith. From the early 1970s, the aspirations of the SRI movement 
morphed significantly in the context of the divestment campaign against South Africa’s apartheid regime. No 
longer were social investors satisfied with just avoiding profit from immoral activities; instead, they also sought to 
change the behavior of others. Business case SRI is a problematic SRI benchmark for several reasons: often there is a 
countervailing business case for financing irresponsible activities, given the failure of markets to capture all social 
and environmental externalities; secondly, even if investors care about such concerns, there may be no means of 
financially quantifying their significance for investment purposes; and, thirdly, even if such factors can be financially 
quantified, they may be deemed to be such long-term financial costs or benefits that they become discounted and 
ignored. The ethics case for SRI and ethical business practices more generally takes the view that both investors and 
the companies they fund have ethical responsibilities that trump the pursuit of profit maximization. Ethical 
investment should be grounded on this foundation. However, it may not be enough. To keep ethical investment 
ethical will likely require institutionalizing new norms and governance standards, in such domains as reforming 
fiduciary duties and the internal governance of financial organizations. SRI’s own codes of conduct including the 
UNPRI have yet to demonstrate the robustness to move the financial community beyond business as usual. 
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The conflicting goals of SRI 
 
The movement for socially responsible investment (SRI), which was once more commonly known as 
‘‘ethical investment’’, increasingly downplays ethics. Historically, it was a different story. The anti-slavery 
campaigns of Quakers in the 1700s and the financial sanctions against South Africa’s apartheid regime 
during the 1970s and 1980s were motivated primarily by unadulterated ethical concerns rather than the 
prospect of financial reward. While SRI was historically ignored by mainstream financial institutions such 
as pension funds and investment banks, their increasing endorsement of it in the last decade has been 
accompanied by changes in the terminology, methods and meaning of SRI. These investors pitch their case 
for acting responsibly on business grounds, on the assumption that SRI may make investors prosperous, 
rather than merely virtuous. However, some significant conflicts may arise by seeking prosperity as a means 
to be ethical. Sometimes, there is no business case for acting ethically. What then? 
In this new mode, SRI may garner attention only to the extent that investors see social or 
environmental issues as ‘‘financially material’’ – in other words, when such issues pose tangible financial 
risks or opportunities. While this business case approach to SRI is attracting more adherents to the 
movement, it may merely tinker with addressing the underlying problems such as pollution, poverty 
and human rights abuses. The prevailing view among many contemporary investors is that the only purely 
‘‘ethical’’ issues are the traditional concerns of the faith-based investors, such as tobacco or gambling. 
Otherwise, social, environmental and sustainable economic development problems are deemed to be 
phenomenon with just differing financial implications. 
Yet, ethical investment should no longer be a discretionary choice for financiers, to follow only if there 
is a compelling business case. All investors, whether or not they profess to follow SRI, should be guided by 
ethical investment policies. In a world facing grave ecological problems and social and economic 
 
 
injustices, the financial sector must shoulder some of the responsibility to mitigate these problems 
(Richardson, 2008). Private investment that has public costs must account for and internalize those costs. 
Indeed, for many reasons, the financial sector should provide ethical leadership on these issues. The 
sector, which includes banks, pension plans, mutual funds and various other types of financiers, 
performs many economically crucial functions including the raising and distributing of capital, and 
managing financial risks. The 2008 collapse of the sub-prime mortgage market in the USA, which 
reverberated worldwide far beyond the banking sector, shows how pivotal the financial economy is to the 
health of the productive economy (Soros, 2008). The financial markets are also where ‘‘wholesale’’ decisions 
concerning future development, and thus eventual environmental pressures, arise. These pressures, once 
warned the United Nations’ Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board (2005, p. 5), are ‘‘putting such strain 
on the natural functions of the Earth that the ability of the planet’s ecosystems to sustain future 
generations can no longer be taken for granted’’. 
Such problems pose significant ethical challenges, the resolution of which will require redefining 
societal measurements of value and establishing new reasons to act. Business case SRI does not reflect 
credible ethical standards that can promote sustainability and social emancipation in the public interest over 
the long term. Market incentives can engender changes only within a rather limited framework that appeals to 
actors’ self-interest. Many contend that only through a new ethical paradigm can humanity evolve 
sustainably and live in harmony with nature (Devall and Sessions, 2001). In 1992, some 1700 international 
scientists proclaimed their ‘‘Warning to Humanity’’, and called for ‘‘[a] new ethic … towards discharging 
our responsibility for caring for ourselves and for the earth’’ (Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992). Many 
others agree that progress toward sustainability depends upon challenging the materialistic and self-
centered values of industrialized, capitalist society (Light and Rolston III, 2002; Soskolne, 2007). Any other 
solution would likely respond only to the symptoms, rather than the root causes, of unsustainable 
 
 
development. In contrast, an ethical view, they contend and we agree, would help decision makers to 
understand and improve human ethical behavior, providing additional grounds to act when, for 
instance, financial incentives are absent. 
But if mainstream financial actors have long chosen to ignore or downplay ethical investment, why 
would they choose to do so now? How could they be persuaded to act differently? Lofty rhetoric calling 
for more enlightened behavior on its own will be unlikely to inspire change voluntarily. There are too 
many countervailing pressures in a competitive market to induce widespread ethical transformation. What 
is needed is new policy instruments designed to encourage ethically responsible investment practices. 
Yet, law alone will also not be enough. Whether the law relies on carrots or sticks to induce compliance, 
the legal system has long been shown to suffer from significant limitations as a means of engineering 
social change (Teubner, 1987). Law must work in partnership with ethical arguments and moral suasion 
with a view to giving investors and other business actors convincing reasons to behave lawfully and in an 
ethically responsibly manner. 
This article explores these ethical arguments and the concomitant legal strategies that are necessary to 
restore an ethical basis to all investment. While the notion of ‘‘ethical’’ or ‘‘ethical investment’’ is imbued 
with much complexity and its meanings are contested, we define it to mean decision-making framed 
and guided by moral principles, such as respect for fundamental human rights and ecological, social and 
economic sustainability, in contrast to decision-making with its commitment to these values being only 
instrumental and self-serving. 
The remainder of our discussion is structured as follows. Part II theorizes how the social and 
environmental responsibilities of financial institutions should be conceived. It draws a distinction between 
the private and public responsibilities of business and concomitantly the changing relationship between the 
 
 
state as a regulator and the market. Having established why an ethical approach is important in business 
including financial investing, Part III critiques the dominant ‘‘business case’’ approach to SRI, and why it 
provides no assurance that social and environmental values will be protected and advanced. Part IV 
examines some of the existing legal mechanisms governing SRI. It also includes a critique of some 
voluntary approaches to SRI governance, including the UN Principles for Responsible Investment 
(UNPRI). Part V canvasses potential legal reforms to give better effect to a more ethical approach to SRI. 
The discussion focuses on the fiduciary duties of investment institutions, because these are the most 
important legal norms that shape the purpose of investing activity. 
Through consideration of these issues, the article aims to contribute to both theoretical understanding of the 
ethical basis to SRI and legal analysis of how SRI is and should be governed. The article takes an 
interdisciplinary approach, engaging with scholarship from business ethics, management theory, corporate 
social responsibility, stakeholder theory and regulatory theory and practice. While we do not dispute that 
financial institutions are economic actors interested in profitability, it is our view that while a legitimate goal, 
the pursuit of profits must take place within an overarching ethical framework of decision-making 
grounded on strong legal and regulatory foundations. In discussing the ethical challenges of SRI, we will 
often characterize these challenges as one of achieving ‘‘sustainability’’ (Richardson, 2006). 
 
Theorizing the ethical responsibilities of investors 
 
The evolving private and public responsibilities of business 
 
Why should investors act ethically? While there is significant literature that has theorized the moral 
responsibility and legal accountability of corporations and their managers with regard to human rights, labor 
 
 
standards, environmental protection and other ethically salient issues, the position of investors in those 
corporations has been relatively neglected. The significant literature on stakeholder theory, business 
ethics and corporate social responsibility has focused on the position of regular corporations and businesses 
while saying relatively little about actors in the financial economy. It is important to take the perspectives 
provided by that literature as a basis for examining the ethical responsibilities of financial institutions. They 
are, as we will shortly explain, quite closely intertwined positions given the role of investors as private sector 
shareholders, bondholders or lenders. 
Perhaps, the greatest obstacle to accomplishing ethical investment is the currently dominant 
management paradigm that views the primary purpose of the investor corporation as profit maximization 
(Bainbridge, 2002, pp. 419–429; Macey, 1991). From the perspective of these theories, if profit 
maximization requires respect for human rights or pollution abatement, there is no problem. If it does not, 
as sometimes occurs, then corporations presumably have an obligation to their shareholders not to allow 
human rights or environmental concerns to impede their profit-maximizing raison d’être. 
This notion is a result of the particular evolution of the modern corporation. Historically, enterprises were 
typically granted authority to conduct business for the purpose of achieving some specific public goal. A 
notable example is the charter granted by the Crown to the Hudson Bay Company to develop Canada’s 
northern regions (Moodie and Lehr, 2008). In the late nineteenth century, the mercantile idea that 
corporations should be chartered only where their activities would advance public goods was replaced 
in many jurisdictions with a legislated framework requiring that only those people wishing to incorporate 
should register their companies following a set of largely formal, and not particularly onerous, 
bureaucratic procedures. Thereafter, the primary obligation of corporations has come to be seen by 
many as to serve the interests of their shareholding investors. Concomitantly, for much of the history of 
the modern corporation, especially since the Second World War, there has been a tacit social contract 
 
 
between the state and private sector that there would be a de facto division of responsibilities between them, 
whereby safeguarding the environment and protecting human rights would be a responsibility of 
governments, while the private sector would be primarily responsible for generating economic wealth 
(Cragg, 2000). Its practical effect has been to encourage many in the corporate world to view human rights 
or environmental protection as only indirect corporate responsibilities in the belief that responsibility for 
setting standards in these areas was solely the prerogative of governments. Concomitantly, references to 
‘‘the invisible hand’’ of the market have been also advanced to counter the argument that business has 
obligations to advance public, as well as private, interests (Marris and Mueller, 1980). The assumption 
is that corporations are the most efficient means of generating wealth, and therefore they should be left to 
pursue the private interests of shareholders unfettered by concerns for the negative social, environmental or 
economic impacts of their activities, a range of responsibilities best left to states (Clark, 1986, pp. 20–21, 
30–32). 
In relation specifically to shareholders, bondholders or other types of investors, there is a further 
consideration that, in the context of a global economy, they may be too remote from the actions of a 
corporation. A fund manager in New York or London may have little knowledge of the operations of a 
firm in a distant country, and which may also represent one of literally hundreds or thousands of 
companies in a large investment portfolio. It thus could be contended that it is unrealistic to hold 
investors legally or morally responsible for negative social, environmental or economic impacts of firms they 
finance. 
These kinds of considerations, however, are no longer (if ever they were) grounds to deny the 
ethical responsibility of investors and their firms to promote sustainability. To explain why, it is necessary to 
begin by examining the relationship between investors and society including its legal system. 
The neo-classical canonical account of the firm is quite compatible with the view that financial 
 
 
institutions and corporations have an obligation to respect and obey the law, including laws relating to 
human rights or environmental protection. Indeed, Milton Friedman described the obligation to respect the 
law as one of the fundamental features of his theory of the firm (Cosans, 2009). However, the 
justification for this view is not clearly articulated by Friedman or other neo-classical theorists; neither is it 
acknowledged that the obligation to obey the law has implications for the social responsibility of firms that 
are much broader than these theorists would concede (Cragg, 2004). 
Financial institutions such as banks and investment companies, as with regular corporations, are a legal 
artifact. They come into existence only where there is a legal framework that creates their institutional 
possibility. The law makes incorporation possible and creates the legal framework for trusts and other 
institutional templates that financial organizations utilize. The law also protects investors in companies 
through the rule of limited liability (Cragg, 2004; Easterbrook and Fischel, 1985). In addition to 
clothing financiers with a legal personality, the legal system creates the conditions that enable markets 
to flourish, such as by establishing and protecting the property rights and contractual responsibilities of 
parties (Sunstein, 1991, p. 608). The legal system is also responsible for an extensive microcosm of rules and 
procedures that govern how financiers and corporations conduct their affairs in specific situations. These 
include licenses to operate, permits to emit pollutants and so on. 
What is at stake for governments is how best to ensure that economic activity contributes to the 
public good. It is not acceptable to justify the creation of the extensive national and international legal 
architecture that frames investment and corporate activity in today’s troubled world on simply the right of 
individuals to invest and make as much money as possible. If the private sector is allowed to pollute and 
degrade the environment, leading to irreparable harms such as global warming or mass species 
extinction, its own future is surely also in jeopardy. Likewise, if societies are allowed to disintegrate into 
violence, widespread poverty and other hardships, business will be deprived of a milieu in which it can 
 
 
flourish. The private sector has therefore a significant implied interest in maintaining a healthy society and 
environment, operating under the rule of law, which makes its activities possible and profitable (Cragg, 
2004). 
In addition to all these reasons why business should act in the public interest, business enterprises 
have stakeholders. In other words, the activities of banks, mutual funds and ordinary corporations impact 
on individuals and groups whose interests are thereby affected both negatively and positively. The activities 
of business thus give those they impact a stake in those activities. A substantial body of literature on 
stakeholder theory has thus explored the moral principles, and their legal manifestations, which bear 
on corporate activities as a result of this situation (Clarkson, 1998; Freeman, 1984; Marjorie, 2001; Stout, 
2002). Stakeholders, such as workers, local communities, consumers and the environment itself all have 
moral status that business managers must reckon with. Indeed, some legal commentators have argued that 
they also may have a legal status in corporate governance, as corporate managers ‘‘have always had some legal 
discretion (implicit or explicit) to sacrifice corporate profits in the public interest’’ and that ‘‘proper 
economic analysis does not prove this discretion is undesirable or even inefficient’’ (Elhauge, 2005, pp. 
738–739). One reason for such discretionary authority is that, unlike corporate managers, 
shareholders may be too distant and insulated from the ‘‘social and moral sanctions’’ applicable to 
corporate conduct that can be costly to a firm if ignored (Elhauge, 2005, p. 740). Among financial 
institutions, bank managers lending to environmentally problematic projects would likewise have the 
discretionary authority to be responsive to these social and moral sanctions that arise from relationships 
with stakeholders. 
It is necessary to pause here, in order to elaborate why financial institutions in particular should act 
ethically to promote sustainability, rather than just to treat this ethical imperative as one for the companies they 
invest in. Capital financing is instrumental to development choices; those who enable and benefit from 
 
 
those choices through financial investment should also share responsibility for resulting harms. Financial 
institutions evolved to mobilize capital and to facilitate financial returns for investors. Anyone who has ever 
enquired at a bank about a personal loan, credit card or mortgage will understand that financial institutions 
do not want their capital sitting around idly. Rather, money has to be actively managed and be 
reinvested to generate profit. This pervasive drive to put capital to use, to make more capital, invariably 
creates a process that fuels widespread social and environmental changes. 
A further consideration in holding financiers accountable, indeed to higher standards than that 
applicable to the companies they fund, is because of the generally greater economic and environmental 
salience and impact of financial institutions. The recent sub-prime, mortgage lending crisis in the USA 
illustrates painfully how failings in one financial sector can produce devastating shock waves across the global 
economy (Soros, 2008). 
Even from a self-interested perspective, financial institutions surely have pragmatic reasons to be socially 
responsible. Hawley and Williams (2000) argue that large institutional investors, which they describe as 
‘‘universal owners’’ investing broadly across the economy, have a financial interest in the health and long-
term sustainability of the entire economy. This is because, as global, economy-wide investors, they have 
nothing to gain long term and much to lose by abetting behavior that is profitable in the short run but 
threatens significant negative impacts for the functioning of the economy or depletion of the natural 
resources on which economic development depends. Acting as a universal investor implies that what is an 
‘‘externality’’ at the level of an individual company may show up as a costly ‘‘internality’’ for an investor’s 
global portfolio. A related reason for acting responsibly is that large institutional investors commonly hold 
assets on behalf of millions of individual investors across a large spectrum of society, who presumably 




Reallocating responsibilities between the state and the market 
 
What is crucially at issue, then, is not simply the end to be achieved, namely a socially just and ecologically 
and economically sustainable world community, but the allocation and implementation of 
responsibilities among various economic actors and stakeholders required if that goal is to be achieved. An 
unchecked free market is certainly not capable of achieving that goal. The assumption that the pursuit of 
private economic interests will consistently generate substantial economic and other public benefits ignores 
the significant ‘‘collateral’’ social and environmental costs, which are typically borne by those who did not 
create them (McMurtry, 1998). However, recognition of an ethical imperative to act differently, even by 
companies in their public statements, has often not altered the underlying behavior of business. 
Their ability to compete effectively in the marketplace, coupled with prevailing assumptions about their 
obligation to maximize profits, militates sharply against investors acting ethically. Not even so-called 
universal owners can necessarily make a difference; even if guided by sound ethical principles, 
collective action problems remain. Institutional investors cannot easily coordinate their activities to 
constrain economic growth safely within the overall capacity of the biosphere. The market contains no 
mechanism to keep economic activity within the carrying capacity of the planet, such as by limiting 
carbon emissions to avoid climate change (Daly, 1992). 
On the other hand, states also can lack the capacity to govern effectively the multifarious social, 
economic and environmental externalities of the market (Sunstein, 1990; Teubner, 1998; Yeager, 
1991). The modern regulatory state using coercive ‘‘command-and-control’’ techniques has struggled to 
control these burdens. The resulting maze of legal controls can reach the point of diminishing marginal returns: 
the effectiveness of further regulation often being outweighed by the administrative costs and difficulties of 
ensuring compliance (Stewart, 2001, pp. 30–31). Systems theory explains how the splintering of modern 
 
 
society into semi-autonomous ‘‘subsystems’’, such as the market and the legal sectors, hinders regulation 
of corporations and financiers. Because they are actors within a market subsystem, their behavior is 
shaped primarily by the market’s norms of exchange, competition, and profitability (Luhmann, 1995). 
Legal rules at odds with those norms will usually be resisted. Consequently, in recent years many countries 
have sought to govern the market through market-imitation economic incentives, such as pollution 
taxes or tradeable carbon emission allowances (United Nations Environment Programme, 2004). While 
this strategy has also helped to build the business case for SRI, it has not provided a comprehensive solution as 
economic policy instruments have usually required extensive ‘‘re-regulation’’ to be operationalized 
(Redgwell, 1997, p. 36). 
Globalization has also greatly diminished the capacity of national governments to set and enforce 
meaningful human rights and environmental standards (Falk, 1999; Sassen, 1996; Wolf, 2001). 
Globalization has not only encouraged the growth of large multinational corporations, some of which 
control budgets that are larger than the budgets of most national states, it has also entailed the emergence 
of vast international financial markets that defy effective regulatory control (Alexander et al., 2006, p. 3). Much 
economic activity is now ultimately a result of the financing decisions of institutional investors, located 
in global financial hubs such as London or New York that are very distant to the productive economy 
in which actual corporate development takes place. Concomitantly, globalization had the effect of 
restricting the ability of nation states to set standards eroded by international free trade agreements, and 
multilateral investment treaties have eroded the ability of nation states to set standards. International 
competition for economic investment opened the door to what has been described as a ‘‘race to the 
bottom’’ or a ‘‘regulatory chill’’ in the quality, extent and enforcement of social, economic and 
environmental regulation (Kozul-Wright and Rowthorn, 1998). These conditions therefore require a 




One plausible alternative is for the private sector to assume some degree of responsibility for ensuring that 
its activities generate public benefits, while relieving states of some of the regulatory burden to promote 
sustainability. Underpinning the license of investors to operate must be an expectation that their activities will 
generate public social and economic benefits and avoid harm. The task is not an easy one, partly because of 
the diffused nature of the public goods and interests at stake. A standard criticism of SRI or other forms of 
corporate social responsibility is how to define the ethical obligations with sufficient precision to hold the 
private sector measurably accountable (Watts, 2009). Some SRI issues involve deeply contested ethical 
issues, such as animal welfare, alcohol, casinos and fertility control. In the absence of an ethical consensus 
on such issues, either in society generally or within a specific investment fund, law makers may have to 
settle for procedural reforms such as obliging funds to allow their members to debate the ethical issues at 
stake and requiring greater transparency about investment policies and their justification. On the other 
hand, some SRI issues involve market failures where the problem is not that an activity is intrinsically 
objectionable, but the fact that there is too much of the activity occurring (e.g., emitting greenhouse 
gases, fishing and cutting trees). Social agreement on controlling these activities is usually much more 
achievable, although there will of course be differences in determining how to do so and who should 
pay for corrective action. Thus, not all ethical concerns may be capable of being enunciated as clear 
normative obligations; some may need to be addressed indirectly through procedural reforms that at 
most facilitate public debate and better rationalization of decisions. 
What then, should the private sector itself do to promote sustainability in a reallocation of 
responsibilities? Allowing it to regulate itself through voluntary codes of conduct such as the UNPRI 
is not likely to be sufficient. Unmonitored corporate commitments without sanctions for 
noncompliance are unlikely to improve corporate behavior when they are costly to implement, something 
 
 
that corporate behavior suggests is all too pervasive (Klein, 2000; Wood, 2006). Voluntary measures 
may even be introduced strategically to circumvent official regulation and thereby forestall meaningful 
change. 
Alternatively, some believe that the profit motive itself can be harnessed to give investors a powerful 
interest in promoting sustainability and acting charitably toward other stakeholders (Donaldson and 
Preston, 1995). Can a pragmatic, business case provide sufficient motivation for SRI? Are financial 
institutions likely to honor commitments to behave responsibly where risk reduction or enhanced 
profitability is unlikely to follow? The record in this respect is not encouraging. The following section 
examines the limitations of the business case approach to SRI. 
 
Business case SRI 
 
While the SRI movement is seeking greater accountability of the financial sector for the environmental 
and social problems connected to the economic activities it funds, it is doing so in a manner that 
works largely within the existing analytical and normative framework of the financial economy (Jeucken, 
2001; Labatt and White, 2002). The SRI sector comprises a diverse array of actors with similarly diverse 
aspirations and strategies, but it is now dominated by institutional and retail investors whose cues are primarily 
the financial costs and benefits of acting responsibly. 
Sustainability issues acquire significance to these investors primarily to the extent that they are 
perceivable as financially ‘‘material’’ (UNEPFI, 2004a). The tools of business case SRI include light-touch 
investment screens that reject only the most insidious firms (so as not to diminish significantly portfolio 
diversification and thus returns), polite engagement with corporate management, and more sophisticated 
analytical methods to assess the financial repercussions of corporate social and environmental 
 
 
behavior. This approach has been endorsed by international SRI networks such as the United 
Nations Environment Programme Finance Initiative (UNEPFI). Catering mainly to the institutional 
investment sector, UNEPFI explains in its report, Show Me the Money (2006, p. 4), that: ‘‘[t]he first – and 
arguably for investors the most important – reason to integrate [SRI] issues is, simply, to make more 
money…’’. In another UNEPFI report (2004b, p. 5), financial analysts are advised to demonstrate 
‘‘material links to business value; … [and] avoid moral arguments’’. Similarly, in the retail market 
catering to household investors, SRI funds are commonly marketed in the same manner as 
conventional portfolios on how they may generate higher returns and outperform the market (Brill et 
al., 1999). 
Not all social investors, however, are so materially self-interested. Some religious investors continue to treat 
SRI as a matter of ethical necessity (Triolo et al., 2000, pp. 26–53). The churches once spearheaded a 
divestment campaign against companies profiting from apartheid in South Africa. They continue to be 
the vanguard of change. An example is the Interfaith Center for Corporate Responsibility’s campaigns 
concerning climate change and environmental justice.1 
The dominant business case approach to SRI is traceable to theories of shareholder primacy, which 
conclude that corporate managers, as well as fund managers, pension fund trustees and other investment 
decision makers have ethical and legal obligations to maximize profits. These obligations flow from the 
fact that, as agents, managers, trustees and other business decision makers have fiduciary obligations 
toward their beneficiaries, whether they be shareholders, pension plan members or the like (Langbein and 
Posner, 1980). Where other stakeholders are concerned, however, the only obligation is to act strategically 
with a view of achieving business objectives. 
Can business drivers lead investors to the same decisions as ethically motivated investors? Respect for 
the environment or human rights often can have a pragmatic value to financial institutions. It is over the long-
 
 
term that being virtuous and prosperous is most likely to be mutually reinforcing. For if economic 
development is allowed to degrade the environment unabated, a point will surely be reached where natural 
resources are so depleted or polluted that the economic costs they pose will prevent any further 
development or raise costs exorbitantly (Daly, 1992). Climate change is an example of a long-term 
environmental threat with the potential for vast economic costs to investors if left unmitigated. Even in 
the short and medium terms, the business case can dovetail with ethical considerations in some situations, if 
the environmental or social costs materialize quickly enough. For instance, increasing natural 
resource scarcity, for example fossil fuels, can hike up the costs of production and make investment in 
affected companies less profitable. Human rights concerns can lead to boycotts. Bribery can lead to punitive 
responses. 
One of the most significant challenges to reliance on such approaches, however, is how to integrate 
effectively qualitative and quantitative, short and long-term, factors into investment decisions. This is an 
acute problem for many forms of SRI where institutional investors remain sceptical of its economic 
value. One attempt at a solution is the model of ‘‘comprehensive ethical decision making’’ advanced by 
Brooks and Dunn (2010, p. 205), which combines philosophical analysis and stakeholder impact analysis. 
The aim is to provide a comprehensive picture and assessment of all variables and to ensure that for example 
the interests of stakeholders are not trivialized. Another innovation to improve measurement and integration 
of qualitative, ethical considerations are the new management approaches embodied in the Global Reporting 
Initiative (GRI) and the ISO 26000 standard. The International Organization for Standardization (ISO) 
will launch in 2010 its first guidance standard on social responsibility. A voluntary standard, the ISO 26000 
aims to ‘‘provide practical guidance related to operationalizing social responsibility, identifying and engaging 
with stakeholders, and enhancing credibility of reports and claims made about social responsibility’’ (ISO, 
2010). Concomitantly, the latest GRI (G3) guidelines serve to provide a comprehensive ‘‘sustainability 
 
 
reporting framework’’ for organizations with regard to content issues such as stakeholder inclusiveness, 
ensuring reliability of information, and providing comprehensive consideration of secondary and indirect 
impacts and issues (GRI, 2010). 
Despite these and other encouraging initiatives, however, given the prevailing business management and 
investment models, building ethical considerations into strategic and day-to-day decision-making can also 
constrain profit maximization. Situations where pollution is tolerated or human rights are not respected can 
offer strategic advantages to investor corporations, such as reduced environmental management costs or 
lower wage rates in these respective examples (Slapper and Tombs, 1999, pp. 167–170). Thus, acting 
responsibly can confer disadvantages as well as advantages. So, while the business case for SRI offers 
pragmatic reasons for ethical investment, it opens the door to pragmatic arguments for investing 
unethically. For financial institutions that profess to invest ethically but act strategically, the solution to 
avoid being embarrassed has been to take advantage of the lack of standardization in the SRI market. The 
laissez-faire market for SRI has allowed a fungible and superficial retail ‘‘ethics’’ to proliferate, where 
salesmanship and marketing may prevail over reflective moral deliberation and principled behavior. 
Indeed, the average SRI portfolio can be little different to a regular investment fund; a 2004 survey by the 
Natural Capital Institute concluded that ‘‘the screening methodologies and exceptions employed by most 
SRI funds allow practically any publicly-held corporation to be considered as an SRI portfolio company’’ 
(Hawken, 2004, p. 16). 
Sometimes ‘‘reputational risks’’ to companies associated with unethical practices may trigger action. 
Given that somewhere between 50 and 70% of the business value of many large public companies is 
attributable to their brand name and goodwill, the risk of a sullied reputation should motivate ethical 
behavior by high profile firms (Purcell, 2007). Reputation risk is often a key driver of companies’ 
relationships with stakeholders upon whom they may depend for their ‘‘social license’’ to operate 
 
 
(Gunningham, 2009). A World Resources Institute report (Herz et al., 2007) argues that the business case 
approach can also motivate more respect for the poor and marginalized where financiers find that their 
projects need community consent and legitimacy. There is strong empirical evidence that corporate 
executives can be persuaded to act ethically based on the perceived impact on their personal reputation 
and/or that of their company (Atkins et al., 2006). Even financial institutions face reputational risks if 
associated with unethical firms. Waygood (2006) has documented how nongovernmental 
organizations such as the World Wide Fund for Nature have been quite successful in improving the 
environmental behavior of companies by targeting their financial sponsors through unwelcome 
publicity campaigns. Nonetheless, reputational risks to investments do not provide a comprehensive 
solution. Sometimes, the most disadvantaged groups or victims of pollution lack the means to publicize 
their plight; financiers or firms of low public visibility are not vulnerable to such reputational risks in 
the first place. Where a financier’s concern is reputational risk, the professed commitment to act 
responsibly can thus amount to nothing more than a good public relations exercise. 
There are further reasons why business case SRI is no assurance for meeting the challenges of sustainability. 
A primary blind spot is that unless social and environmental issues are perceived to have tangible financial 
implications, investors may ignore them. Often they are perceived as too nebulous for workable financial 
quantification (McGeachie et al., 2005, p. 57). Values such as biodiversity or climate integrity cannot be 
captured by conventional financial accounting systems unless they give rise to specific expenses and 
income attributable to an individual organization (Goodman and Little, 2003). A further, related limitation 
is that while the SRI community increasingly argues that there is a ‘‘longterm’’ business case for investing 
responsibly on such issues as climate change, the problem is that market pressures to act for the short-term can 
readily trump perceived long-term costs and benefits. For example, the incentive system for fund managers 
on shortterm contracts can hinder their willingness to move their focus beyond current performance and 
 
 
market valuations (Juravle and Lewis, 2008, p. 290). 
Just as the business case rationale to act ethically can also under different circumstances motivate 
unethical conduct, the decision to operate within the constraints of the law, including environmental, 
economic or social regulation, can also be viewed strategically. Similarly, strategic considerations can also 
generate resistance to legal reform aimed at making investors accountable beyond the bottom line. In 
1996, the US banking industry successfully lobbied Congress to amend the Superfund legislation to obtain a 
safe harbor from lender liability suits for cleanup of contaminated lands.2 Also, the mutual fund industry 
in North America fiercely resisted regulations to make it publicly disclose how they vote as 
shareholders (Davis et al., 2006, p. 73). In other policy domains such as climate change, toxic pollutants 
and labor standards, the corporate sector has time and again sought to block credible regulations (Beder, 
2002). 
Yet, as explained earlier, financial institutions and corporations are legal artifacts, which can exist only 
where legal systems make it possible for them to exist. The private sector can only operate successfully 
within societies with functioning legal systems. Actions that undermine those legal systems will tend to 
undermine the success of business itself. A financial institution or corporation, which seeks to respect 
the law only when to do so has instrumental value for itself, generates policies that directly conflict with the 
legal framework and practices that are ultimately necessary for the success of that financial institution or 
corporation. They do not stand apart from society as distinct self-justifying organizations (Cragg, 2004). 
Business case SRI thus exhibits substantial flaws. This leaves us with a final question. Can the legal 
system create a framework to nurture a more ethical and responsible financial sector? The following section 
explores this issue. 
 




The relationship between SRI and the legal system has only begun to be scrutinized (Richardson, 2008). 
Until the current global financial crisis, there had been a widespread assumption among policy makers and 
investors that the market is generally efficient and functions best with minimal governmental 
oversight. Concomitantly, regulators have connected ecological, economic and social problems only 
to companies that wield operational control over development, such as mining or manufacturing firms, but 
not to their financial sponsors. While such assumptions are increasingly questioned, it has not yet led to 
transformative regulation designed to instill greater accountability on the part of financial institutions. 
SRI reforms adopted so far have been mainly market-based informational standards that leave fi nciers with 
signifi nt discretion (Richardson, 2007). For example, most governments’ principal response to the financial 
meltdown of 2008–2009 has so far been huge bailouts of insolvent banks and investment companies 
with limited attention to fundamentally altering the way they are regulated. 
To date, SRI regulation has typically involved process standards, for example, mechanisms requiring 
financial institutions to report their SRI policies, proxy voting activities and environmental impacts of financial 
significance. These requirements are designed to enable the assessment and verification of investment 
policies and performance and, in theory, thereby put pressure on environmental laggards to change or 
reward leaders through competitive market advantages. For example, in the UK, several other European 
states and Australia, occupational pension funds must now disclose their SRI policies.3 In Canada and the 
USA, mutual funds must disclose their proxy voting policies and voting records when acting as shareholders.4 
Yet, even where these policies are in place, financial institutions are free not to invest ethically, so long as they 
disclose that decision publicly. In practice, their mandated disclosures often entail vague, perfunctory 
statements that reveal little about the rationale or methodology behind their SRI policies or the quality 
of their implementation (Fair Pensions, 2006). In theory, procedural standards could usefully nurture 
 
 
more open and participatory decision-making, as a means of cultivating ethical positions. But there is 
little evidence to date that currently adopted reforms have enabled such practices. 
Consistent with business case SRI, some governments have also introduced economic policy 
instruments, such as green investment tax concessions (e.g., in the Netherlands)5 or environmental 
liability for financiers (e.g., in the USA). In principle, such measures improve the cost–benefit equation 
in favor of sustainable development. By appealing to financiers’ self-interest, they can provide a 
powerful incentive for financiers to act responsibly. A 2002 study by KPMG found that the Dutch 
scheme between 1996 and 2002 had delivered e2.8 billion of investment from 140,000 individual 
investors in over 2,100 projects. Such results, however, hardly justify legislating SRI primarily through 
economic incentives. Many environmental, economic and social issues are too complex to be broken 
down into discrete targets to be financially rewarded. Setting goals for reducing greenhouse gas emissions is 
much easier to measure and reward than maintaining biological diversity or the integrity of entire  
ecosystems. 
Normative standards, which can provide substantive principles to guide investment, are not 
widely availed in SRI governance. In some jurisdictions, national pension funds are obliged to invest 
responsibly and ethically. These measures have been adopted in France, New Zealand, Norway and 
Sweden. For example, the Norwegian Pension Fund is obliged by its governing regulations to ‘‘not make 
investments which constitute an unacceptable risk that the Fund may contribute to unethical acts or 
omissions, such as violations of fundamental humanitarian principles, serious violations of human rights, 
gross corruption or severe environmental damages’’.6 An ethics council guides the fund in discerning 
ethical investment choices. Based on recommendations of the council, the Norwegian Fund has 
divested from companies dealing with cluster bombs (Lockheed Martin), nuclear weapons components 
 
 
(Boeing), breaches of human rights and labor standards (Wal-Mart), and environmental damage 
(Freeport). A recent survey of the Norwegian and other public sector funds ‘‘highlight[ed] a range of some 
of the most advanced and creative approaches to responsible investment’’ (UNEPFI, 2007, p. 7). 
The financial community has also devised its own standards for SRI. A plethora of codes of conduct has 
emerged in recent years, including the London Principles of Sustainable Finance (2002), Equator 
Principles (2003) and the UNPRI (2006). Some codes have also been tailored to specific SRI issues, 
particularly climate change: these include the Carbon Disclosure Project (2000), Carbon Principles 
(2008) and the Climate Principles (2008). The track record of financial institutions that have voluntarily 
committed to such standards, however, is generally less than exemplary. These voluntary codes generally do 
not require signatories to attain any threshold performance as a condition of joining, nor meet any 
substantive social or environmental standards afterward. The codes’ principal requirements are procedural, 
such as periodic reporting and disclosure of activities. 
Consider the example of the UNPRI. It is a succinct code comprising just six principles, each of which 
is illustrated by several possible actions. Its first principle states: ‘‘We will incorporate environmental, social 
and corporate governance (ESG) issues into investment analysis and decision-making processes’’. Among 
the list of conceivable actions for the first principle, there is no stated expectation that investors actually 
incorporate social or environmental factors into their ultimate portfolios. The UNPRI do not require a 
signatory to demonstrate any particular performance standards with regard to human rights or 
environmental protection. Conceivably, therefore, a UNPRI signatory could continue to invest in the fossil 
fuel industry and satisfy the first principle by merely reviewing the direct financial risks posed by 
global warming. The UNPRI also do not provide an independent audit or verification mechanism to assess 
the quality of signatories’ implementation, a curious omission given how the financier sector in other 
contexts insists on increased transparency by the firms they fund. The fact that the UNPRI enjoys extensive 
 
 
support in the mainstream financial sector, including from CalPERS and Stichting Pensioenfonds ABP, 
should not necessarily be interpreted as grounds for its success. Rather, it might just reflect the easiness 
of the principles, which leave signatories with considerable latitude to implement the open-ended standards. 
More ambitious ethical charters relevant to the financial sector exist, but they have been largely 
shunned by investors. The Collevecchio Declaration on Financial Institutions, drafted in 2003 by a coalition 
of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),7 lists several rigorous standards specifically for financial markets, 
based on six core principles, namely: sustainability, ‘‘do no harm’’, responsibility, accountability, 
transparency, and sustainable markets and governance. For instance, the Declaration’s ambitious 
‘‘commitment to sustainability’’ principle obliges signatories to ‘‘fully integrate the consideration of ecological 
limits [and] social equity … into corporate strategies and core business areas (including credit, investing, 
underwriting, advising), to put sustainability objectives on an equal footing to shareholder maximization 
and client satisfaction…’’. Yet, apart from the California Public Employees’ Retirement System, no 
financial institution has endorsed the Declaration as of August 2010. 
Another ambitious statement of ethics is evoked by the Earth Charter.8 It was adopted in 2000 
following lengthy consultation mainly held among NGOs, and encouragingly has endorsements from 
some 3,000 organizations and governments worldwide. The charter contains several principles relevant to 
the business sector, including: ‘‘[e]nsure that economic activities and institutions at all levels promote 
human development in an equitable and sustainable manner’’. While quite a few business organizations 
have endorsed the Earth Charter, they have probably done so because the Charter’s provisions are so 
broadly stated that signatories cannot be measurably held to account and the Charter lacks the machinery to 
enforce compliance. 
We need then to consider legal reforms designed to promote ethical investment. This should not be 
taken to imply that the law alone can ensure that investment policies are operative within ethical 
 
 
frameworks. What the law can accomplish is contingent on the kind of economic, cultural and 
political conditions in which it functions. Crucial to the success of legal strategies in this respect are 
ethical arguments and debates that can help persuade financial institutions and investors to act ethically. 
 
Promoting ethical investing through fiduciary duties 
 
The ethical and legal baselines 
 
So how then might we improve the ethics of ethical investment? How should ethical investment 
frameworks and principles be determined and by what means should they be advanced? As 
previously explained, some ethical issues on the SRI agenda involve highly contentious activities, such as 
tobacco production or fertility control, where there is widespread societal disagreement. But there are 
other activities, such as pollution, overfishing and deforestation. These are examples of market failures or 
tragedies of the commons, which ultimately can be as devastating to the economy as to the 
environment. These concerns are amenable to ethical standard setting and legal regulation with a view to 
ensuring that economic development is conducted sustainably. Breaches of human rights, another 
concern of many social investors, do not per se involve market failures. Yet, they may also be 
actionable because there can exist widespread social agreement on the value of these rights, for example 
protection against racial discrimination. 
A second important consideration to note at this stage is who are the investors to whom these ethical 
issues or controversies apply? We can distinguish between individuals who invest on their own behalf 
(commonly known as ‘‘retail investors’’) and financial intermediaries, such as pension funds or life insurance 
companies, which invest on behalf of others. There will always be some room for individuals to choose 
 
 
lawful investments according to their own moral scruples by avoiding companies that engage in activities 
they find personally offensive, whether it be selling alcohol or operating a casino. But where financial 
institutions manage the assets of millions of people and have the capacity to exert huge economic influence, it 
is important to ensure that they are governed by environmental and social standards that avoid exacerbating 
the market failures or human rights abuses described above. They should be regarded as institutions with 
identifiable public responsibilities. 
In determining what standards financial intermediaries should follow, the law of the land is not an 
adequate moral compass. If it were, then it would follow that if a corporate development such as a 
mining project was ostensibly lawful with the requisite licenses and other regulatory approvals, then it would 
be perfectly acceptable for an ethical investor to fund that project without regard for its social or 
environmental  impacts. 
Legal systems often fail to supply adequate social and environmental standards. Legal theorists have long 
identified a series of explanations for this problem, which include the ability of powerful corporate 
interests to ‘‘capture’’ the regulatory process and block the enactment and implementation of laws 
unfavorable to their interests (Laffont and Tirole, 1991). Further, in some countries, particularly in 
emerging economies, the state is weakened by corruption, civil strife, insufficient resources and other factors 
that undermine its capacity to fulfill its responsibilities (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2002). Examples are 
widely thought to include the Congo, Sudan and Pakistan. It would thus be preposterous to suggest that merely 
because a mining project in such countries is ‘‘lawful’’ that it meets adequate ethical investment standards. 
Given that one of the traditional purposes of SRI has been to advance change, to push corporations beyond 
the letter of the law, it would seem counterproductive to be guided only by the existing legal baseline. 
Finally, the law is not an adequate SRI benchmark because it is often unclear what ‘‘the law’’ is. 
Typically, most corporate activities or products are subject to impact assessments, permits, and other 
 
 
checks where regulators wield significant discretionary power to make decisions on a case-by-case basis. 
Further, complex interactions between different areas of law may arise; for instance, an emission license 
does not necessarily shield a polluter from other legal actions such as tort suits.9 There is also the role of 
international law to consider: what may be lawful in an individual nation may run afoul of international 
standards set by organizations like the International Labour Organization (ILO). 
 
Existing fiduciary law and SRI 
 
What this discussion suggests is that ethical investment requires its own legal apparatus that directly 
targets the financial sector. The fiduciary duties of financial institutions are the most legally significant part 
of that apparatus, although presently they are generally not conducive to ethical investment. The legal 
system imposes fiduciary standards on financial intermediaries to invest carefully in the interests of their 
beneficiaries and in accordance with the purpose of the particular fund.10 A fiduciary relationship involves a 
duty of loyalty, requiring the fiduciary to act in the beneficiaries’ sole or best interests (Langbein, 
2005). The fiduciary also has a duty of competence, requiring skill and diligence, which is usually 
expressed in the investment context as the ‘‘prudent investor rule’’ (Longstreth, 1986). 
 
Fiduciary standards constrain SRI in principally two ways. First, there is a widespread presumption that 
the best interests of the beneficiaries of a fund are of a financial character. Some British court rulings such 
as in Cowan v Scargill11 and other cases12 suggest pension funds are liable to their beneficiaries for losses if they 
sacrifice financial returns at the altar of ethical principle. Of course, if the governing deed of a financial 
institution expressly requires social investment to further a specified mission, then the fiduciary must 
fulfill the specified criteria unless legislation dictates otherwise.13 Investment by charitable foundations can 
 
 
fall into this situation. However, typically the directors of banks and other financial institutions do 
not owe these kinds of fiduciary duties to their institutions and shareholders. Rather, their fundamental legal 
responsibility is to act in a financially prudent manner.14 
The second seminal way that fiduciary duties frustrate SRI is by relegating whose money an 
institution is responsible for investing to a passive role (Alexander, 1993). Rather than treating 
beneficiaries in pension plans as self-governing and responsible owners, fiduciary rules reduce them to a 
largely passive and voiceless status in investment decision-making, usually entitled only to be 
‘‘informed’’ about how fiduciaries, those responsible, invest their assets. Unless required by special 
legislation, fiduciaries need not consult with beneficiaries. They only need to act in their ‘‘best interests’’. 
They do not need to ask whether those whose funds they handle understand what their best interests are. 
Fiduciary duties were first seen as a hindrance in the 1980s during the South African divestment 
campaign (Troyer et al., 1985). Today, the impact of fiduciary duties on a much more heterogeneous SRI 
agenda is under increasing scrutiny. The World Economic Forum (2005, p. 10) has recommended that 
authorities ‘‘[m]odify pension fiduciary rules which discourage or prohibit explicit trustee consideration 
of social and environmental aspects of corporate performance’’. A report commissioned by UNEPFI 
(Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer, 2005, p. 13) has suggested that ‘‘integrating [SRI] considerations into an 
investment analysis so as to predict more reliably financial performance is clearly permissible and is arguably 
required in all jurisdictions’’. But this recommendation assumes a business case perspective. A successor 
report issued by UNEPFI in 2009, examining developments in fiduciary law since the Freshfields report, 
concludes that ‘‘some institutional investors still appear to be uncertain about the breadth of their discretion 
to consider [environmental, social and governance] issues’’ (UNEPFI, 2009, p. 64). Further, some legal 
commentators suggest that many of the practices of the SRI industry today are of ‘‘doubtful legality’’ 
(Thornton, 2008, p. 415) from a fiduciary perspective. 
 
 
To date, there have been very few reforms that allow fiduciaries to give independent weight to third 
party interests. In the USA, Connecticut legislation provides that managers of the State Retirement Plans and 
Trust Funds may consider the environmental and social implications of investments.15 But whether they 
can do so at the expense of financial returns is unclear. In Canada, Manitoba’s Trustee Act was amended in 
1995 to permit trustees to consider nonfinancial criteria in their investment policies, so long as ‘‘the 
trustee exercises the judgment and care that a person of prudence, discretion and intelligence would exercise 
in administering the property of others’’.16 However, taking nonfinancial considerations into account is 
discretionary, nor does a discretionary standard allow affected third parties to enforce their interests. 
There is a difference between taking the interests of other stakeholders into account and owing a duty to those 
parties. The duty of loyalty that a fiduciary owes remains to the fund’s beneficiaries under these reforms.17 
Mandatory corporate responsibility legislation in company law, however, is not unprecedented. A rare 
example is the UK’s Companies Act of 2006, which comes ‘‘close to a stakeholder model of director’s 
duties’’, according to Williams and Conley (2007, p. 354). Section 172(1) of this statute requires the directors 
of a company in promoting the success of their firm to ‘‘have regard’’ to ‘‘the impact of the company’s 
operations on the community and the environment’’. Breach of this duty could make a corporate 
transaction voidable and result in civil liability to directors. Applied to financial institutions, such a 
standard could help to redefine fiduciary duties of institutional investors along the lines of Hawley 
and Williams’ (2000) ‘‘universal owner’’ thesis. The financial success of institutional investors, with 
economy-wide portfolios, is unlikely to be insulated from the social and environmental stresses that a 
single corporation may avoid. 
 




Reforming fiduciary duties to resolve the conflict between profit maximization and ethical investment is 
not straightforward. Aside from the political problems in mustering support for such a legislated reform, 
considerable practical difficulties in designing a credible legal standard exist. It would be unworkable if 
financial institutions were merely accountable to vague prescriptions such as to ‘‘promote sustainable 
development’’. Like the broader societal debates about sustainable development, such a general goal would 
be subject to discretionary interpretations that would allow problematic tradeoffs and perfunctory 
implementation. It would therefore need to be embellished with prophylactic rules. But if they could be 
successfully redefined, financial institutions that failed to meet them could be subject to various penalties, 
ranging from damages suits brought by aggrieved fund members to regulatory sanctions including future 
restrictions on their investment choices or financial penalties to reflect social costs. 
Social accounting and sustainability indicators provide metrics that could help quantify social, 
economic and environmental performance to underpin a new fiduciary standard. But they may be too 
complex to administer. They may also have the effect of reducing ethical principle to procrustean 
mechanical formats. Social accounting aims to measure the collateral benefits (e.g., public infrastructure 
and environmental protection) and costs (e.g., damage to natural environments) of economic activity 
(Quarter et al., 2003; Unerman et al., 2007). Social accountants, however, have yet to devise means to 
valuate all social or environmental impacts. Further, this approach if achievable would require fundamental 
changes to the prevailing generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). So far, social accounting 
has mostly resulted in satellite, narrative reporting schemes, such as ‘‘management discussion and analysis’’ 
sections in corporate financial statements. 
Sustainability indicators have likewise remained somewhat of an experimental concept. They allow 
progress toward sustainability based on certain social, environmental, economic and other markers that can 
be tracked over time (Bell and Morse, 2008). They can also assist decision makers by translating 
 
 
ecological, economic and social data into performance standards that can point to impending problems. 
While sustainability indicators can be just as complex methodologically as social accounting metrics, 
they do not per se require financial quantification and they do not dictate how to meet underlying 
performance standards. 
To date, however, the design of adequate sustainability indicators for financial institutions’ portfolios 
has not been accomplished. One innovative attempt to quantify an important externality of an entire 
investment  portfolio is  Trucost’s annual ‘‘carbon counts’’ survey, which measures and ranks UK 
investment  funds according  to the carbon intensity of their portfolios (a seminal indicator of 
sustainability). Its evaluation of 185 investment funds in 2007 found that 25% of the so-called SRI funds 
polluted more than the average conventional fund (Trucost, 2007). As for social accounting, some 
activities or impacts likely cannot be quantified for the purposes of a sustainability indicator. One 
example is the evaluation of the social equity in the distribution of the benefits and burdens of use of the 
environment. 
Metrics for reforming fiduciary duties would be most appropriate for addressing market failures such as 
greenhouse gas emissions or toxic pollution and, somewhat more challengingly, social harms including 
transgression of basic human rights. But what about the ethical issues where there is no ‘‘ethical 
custom’’ to guide standards, such as contraception technologies, animal experimentation or vulgar 
entertainment? Public opinion is greatly divided on the ethical status of such issues. Some legal scholars thus 
cite these examples as reasons not to change fiduciary duties. Thornton (2008, p. 419) argues: ‘‘[w]hat 
is considered to be ‘ethical’ in investment terms is inherently subjective, imprecise and continually 
changing with altered societal perspectives: a difficult basis on which to found legal reform’’. 
In such circumstances, rather than attempt to simplify complex ethical issues and debates into 
discrete standards, law reformers could less ambitiously alter financial decision-making procedures to 
 
 
oblige fiduciaries to consider the ethical ramifications of their decisions and to report publicly on their 
decisions and rationales. While in some jurisdictions, pension funds are already required to disclose 
publicly their SRI policies, presently they generally do not need to disclose how they implement such 
policies or why they chose such policies. One could even require such disclosures to be audited by 
third parties to ensure their accuracy. 
Another procedural reform would be to democratize decision-making processes. Watt (2006, p. 437) 
has suggested that fiduciaries could be placed under a legislated duty to consult with their beneficiaries and 
to consider their opinions when formulating investment policies. As for consulting with other stakeholders, 
already the Equator Principles of 2003 require signatory banks to consult with local communities, who may 
be affected by projects they plan to finance. One rationale for these consultative mechanisms is that the 
governing boards of pension trusts or investment funds are typically drawn from a narrow segment of society 
and may lack expertise on SRI issues (Gribben and Gitsham, 2006). Nonetheless, the problem with 
reforms that seek to give a voice to the beneficiaries of a fund or other stakeholders is that the views of a 
minority may be overridden where there is no consensus of opinion, and the relative weight that fiduciaries 
attach to the various views cannot be readily scrutinized. Where a fiduciary must consider numerous, 
conflicting interests without any way of prioritizing among them, any decision taken that is not 
blatantly selfinterested may become defensible. 
A potential remedy to these problems might be to create a voice for stakeholders in an external entity, such 
as a national ethics council. The state could appoint a body of representatives from key constituencies to 
devise standards for ethical investment. Fiduciaries would receive guidance on difficult ethical 
questions, avoiding trial and error. Sweden and Norway have already established ethics councils to guide 
their public pension funds and, in the case of the Norwegian council, it has made recommendations to 
divest from companies such as Wal-Mart and Barrick Gold, which have been accepted by the fund 
 
 
administrators (Criscione, 2009). 
This article is not designed to provide a comprehensive analysis of other legal reforms that could 
strengthen the prospects for ethical investment. A few brief comments regarding other potential collateral 
reforms, however, are in order. Fiduciary duties, no matter how restructured, will not encompass all 
financial activities. For example, in the retail investment market, mutual funds have much more flexibility in 
their investment choices and conceivably can cater to any values investors demand including those oppressive 
to human rights or the environment. Therefore, other kinds of policy tools must be harnessed to capture 
the diverse array of financial entities and transactions. As a priority, reformers must seek to improve the quality of 
corporate environmental and social reporting. Having companies report regularly and comprehensively on 
their environmental, economic and social activities and impacts can help generate reliable information 
that can be used to inform SRI choices (Harte et al., 1991). 
Corporate governance must also be reformed. The importance of democratizing governance within 
financial institutions has already been noted. Comparable reforms at the corporate level are necessary given 
that ethical investors sometimes rely on shareholder advocacy as a means of changing recalcitrant firms 
from within (Del Guercio and Hawkins, 1999). In some jurisdictions, significant barriers to shareholder 
activism persist, such as restrictions on the type of issues that can be raised in a shareholder resolution and 
the passive culture of voting fostered by proxy contest rules (Sarra, 2003). At an international level, states 
should negotiate agreements setting social and environmental standards for transnational finance. In a 
global economy, SRI governance can hardly continue to rest solely on disparate national standards 
(Doering et al., 2002, 
p. 54). International-level financial regulation would mitigate a deleterious race to the bottom, as common 
standards should reduce the incentives for financiers to flee to the most regulatorily benign markets. 
The existing voluntary international standards, such as the UNPRI or the Equator Principles, are not 
 
 




While the SRI market is ostensibly flourishing, the financial economy remains largely unchanged. An 
unresolved tension between the financial and ethical aspirations of SRI persists. Some investors may 
acknowledge environmental, economic or social problems where they are financially material to the 
bottom line. The business case model of SRI, however, sanguinely transforms the tensions 
between environmental protection or social justice and profitable investment into a seemingly harmonious 
and synergistic relationship. Socially responsible investment is then loaded with rhetoric on how 
being virtuous can enable one to be prosperous. 
This is not to deny that sustainability or SRI and business success can be compatible. Based on a 
philosophy of financial materiality, the business case may address some environmental and social problems 
through improved research and analysis. However, it cannot accommodate those issues not valued by 
the market. Further, unless financial advantage can be demonstrated, pollution or social inequities or 
economic injustices will be ignored especially in the absence of effective government regulation and 
stakeholder pressure. Indeed, a countervailing business case might to the contrary justify ignoring or 
tolerating socially, economically or environmentally unsustainably practices. 
Encouraging investment guided by ethical values and principles will necessitate significant regulatory 
change. Legal systems have the capacity to translate a society’s values and expectations into workable 
policy instruments. For SRI to have a significant ethical impact, the reformulation of fiduciary duties is 
crucial as they define the core goals and processes of decision-making within financial institutions. By 
redefining fiduciary duties, investor ‘‘benefit’’ can be reconceptualized and sustainable development made a 
 
 
legally grounded investment priority. The law, however, cannot stand alone. Both the law and legal reform 
will need to be grounded on ethical justifications that can motivate companies and investors to improve their 
behavior. Conversely, ethical investment will be resisted if investors regard it simply as a regulatory 
prescription. There must be room for some ongoing ethical reflection designed to illuminate the 
importance of ethical investment where the pursuit of profits collides or appears to collide with a commitment 
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21, 23. 
4  Securities Exchange Commission (SEC), ‘‘Disclo- 
sure of Proxy Voting Policies  and Proxy Voting Records by Registered Management Investment Companies’’ 
(SEC, January 31, 2003), 17 CFR Parts 239, 
249, 270, and 274; Canadian Securities Administrators 
(2005). 
5 The scheme was revamped and extended in 2002 and 2005:  Regeling  groenprojecten  buitenland,  Staatscourant 1 (2 
January, 2002) 31; Regeling groenprojecten, Staatscourant 131 (11 July, 2005) 13. 
6   Issued December 22 2005 pursuant to Regulation on 
the Management of the Government Pension Fund, 2004, at: http://odin.dep.no/fin/english/topics/pension_fund/p10 
002777/guidelines/bn.html. 
7   See http://www.foe.org/camps/intl/declaration.html. 
8   http://www.earthcharter.org. 
9 See, e.g., the cases of Mandrake Management v. Toronto Transit Commission (1993) 102 D.L.R. (4th); Wheeler v. J.J. 
Saunders Ltd, [1995] 3 W.L.R. 466. 
10  This fiduciary relationship is a concept of English 
law by which specific assets are held and managed by the trustee (i.e., the fiduciary) in the interests of the 
beneficiary (Hudson, 1999). Functionally similar legal arrangements in financial regulation tend to exist in civil 
law jurisdictions. 
11     [1985] 1 Ch. 270. 
12 Martin v City of  Edinburgh  District  Council  [1988] SLT 329; Bishop of Oxford v Church Commissioners for England 
[1992] 1 WLR 1241. 
13  Pension legislation often mandates priority to finan- 
cial investment returns (e.g., US’s Employee Retirement Income Security Act 1974, s. 404(a)(1)(D). 
14    Glover (1995, p. 50). 
15   Conn. Gen. Stat. (2002), s. 3-13d(a). 
16 Trustee Act, S.M. 1995, s. 79.1. In 2005, a similar provision was grafted into Manitoban pension legislation: 
Pension Benefits Amendment Act, S.M. 2005, s. 28.1(2.2). 






Alexander, G.: 1993, ‘Pensions and Passivity’, Law and Contemporary Problems 5(1), 111–139. 
Alexander, K., R. Dhumale and J. Eatwell: 2006, Global Governance of Financial Systems (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford). 
Atkins, D., I. Drennan and L. Bates: 2006, Reputational Risk: A Question of Trust (Lessons Professional Publishing, 
London). 
Bainbridge, S. M.: 2002, Corporation Law and Economics 
(Foundation Press, New York). 
Beder, S.: 2002, Global Spin. The Corporate Assault on Environmentalism (Green Books, Dartington, UK). 
Bell, S. and S. Morse: 2008, Sustainability Indicators: Measuring the Immeasurable (Earthscan, London). 
Brill, H., J. A. Brill and C. Feingenbaum: 1999, Investing with Your Values: Making Money and Making a Difference 
(Bloomberg Press, Princeton). 
Brinkerhoff, D. W. and J. M. Brinkerhoff: 2002, ‘Governance Reforms and Failed States: Challenges and 
Implications’, International Review of Administrative Sciences 68(4), 511–531. 
Brooks, L. J. and P. Dunn: 2010, Business and Professional Ethics for Directors, Executives and Accountants, 5th Edition 
(South-Western Cengage Learning, Mason). 
Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA): 2005, National 
Instrument 81-106 Investment Fund Continuous Disclosure and Companion Policy 81-106CP (CSA). 
Clark, R.: 1986, Corporate Law (Aspen Publishers, New York). 
Clarkson, M.: 1998, The Corporation and Its Stakeholders: Classic and Contemporary Readings (University of Toronto 
Press, Toronto). 
Cosans, C.: 2009, ‘Does Milton Friedman Support a Vigorous Business Ethics?’, Journal of Business Ethics 87(3), 
391–399. 
Cragg, W.: 2000, ‘Human Rights and Business Ethics: Fashioning a New Social Contract’, Journal of Business Ethics 
27(1–2), 205–214. 
Cragg, W.: 2004, ‘Human Rights, Globalization and the Modern  Shareholder  Owned  Corporation’,  in 
T.  Campbell  (ed.),  Human  Rights  and  the  Moral 
Responsibilities of Corporate and Public Sector Organisations 
(Kluwer, Dordrecht), pp. 105–128. 
Criscione, V.: 2009, March 16, ‘Pension Fund Treads a Thorny Path’, Financial Times, p. 9. 
Daly, H.: 1992, ‘Allocation, Distribution and Scale: Towards an Economics that is Efficient, Just and Sustainable’, 
Ecological Economics 6, 185–193. 
Davis, S., J. Lukomnik and D. Pitt-Watson: 2006, The 
New Capitalists: How Citizen Investors are Reshaping the Corporate Agenda (Harvard Business School Press, 
Cambridge). 
Del Guercio, D. and J. Hawkins: 1999, ‘The Motivation and Impact of Pension Fund Activism’, Journal of Financial 
Economics 52, 293–340. 
Devall, B. and G. Sessions: 2001, Deep Ecology: Living as if Nature Mattered (Gibbs Smith, Layton). 
Doering, D., et al.: 2002, Tomorrow’s Markets – Global Trends and Their Implications for Business (World Resources 
Institute, Washington, DC). 
Donaldson, T. and L. E. Preston: 1995, ‘The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: Concepts, Evidence, and 
Implication’, Academy of Management Review 20(1), 65–91. Easterbrook, H. and D. R. Fischel: 1985, ‘Limited Liability 
and the Corporation’, University of Chicago Law 
Review 52, 89–117. 
Elhauge, E.: 2005, ‘Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest’, New York University Law Review 80(3), 733–
869. 
Fair Pensions: 2006, UK Pension Scheme Transparency on Social, Environmental and Ethical Issues (Fair Pensions, 
London). 
Falk, R.: 1999, Predatory Globalization: A Critique (Polity Press, Cambridge). 
Freeman, E.: 1984, Strategic Management: A Stakeholder Approach (Pitman, Boston). 
Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer: 2005, A Legal Framework 
for the Integration of Environmental, Social and Governance Issues into Institutional Investment (UNEPFI, Geneva). 




Glover, J.: 1995, ‘Banks and Fiduciary Relationships’, 
Bond Law Review 7(1), 50–66. 
Goodman, S. and T. Little: 2003, The Gap in GAAP: An Examination of Environmental Accounting Loopholes (Rose 
Foundation, Oakland). 
Gribben, C. and M. Gitsham: 2006, Will UK Pension 
Funds Become More Responsible: A Survey of Trustees 
(UK Social Investment Forum, London). 
Gunningham, N.: 2009, Corporate Environmental Responsibility (Ashgate, Farnham). 
Harte, G., L. Lewis and D. Owen: 1991, ‘Ethical Investment and the Corporate Reporting Function’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting 12(3), 227–253. 
Hawken, P.: 2004, Socially Responsible Investing (Natural Capital Institute, Sausalito). 
Hawley, J. and A. Williams: 2000, The Rise of Fiduciary Capitalism (University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia). 
Herz, S., A. Vina and J. Sohn: 2007, Development Without 
Conflict:  The  Business  Case  for  Community  Consent 
(World Resources Institute, Washington, DC). 
Hudson,   A.:   1999,   Principles   of   Equity   and   Trusts 
(Cavendish, London). 
International Organization for Standardization (ISO): 2010, ‘About ISO Social Responsibility’, http://isotc. 
iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/2000/2122/830949/ 3934883/3935096/07_gen_info/aboutStd.html. 
Jeucken, M.: 2001, Sustainable Finance and Banking: The Financial Sector and the Future of the Planet (Earthscan, 
London). 
Juravle, C. and A. Lewis: 2008, ‘Identifying Impediments  to SRI in Europe: A Review of the Practitioner and 
Academic Literature’, Business Ethics: A European Review 17(3), 285–310. 
Klein, N.: 2000, No Logo (Flamingo Harper-Collins, London). 
Kozul-Wright, R. and R. Rowthorn: 1998, ‘Spoilt for Choice? Multinational Corporations and the Geography of 
International Production’, Oxford Review of Economic Policy 14(2), 74–92. 
Labatt, S. and R. White: 2002, Environmental Finance: A 
Guide to Environmental Risk Assessment and Financial Products (Wiley, New York). 
Laffont, J. and J. Tirole: 1991, ‘The Politics of Government Decision Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 106(4), 1089– 1127. 
Langbein, J.: 2005, ‘Questioning the Trust Law Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?’, Yale Law Journal 
114, 929–990. 
Langbein, J. and R. A. Posner: 1980, ‘Social Investing and the Law of Trusts’, Michigan Law Review 79, 72– 112. 
Light, A. and H. Rolston III (eds.): 2002, Environmental Ethics: An Anthology (Blackwell, Oxford). 
Longstreth, B.:  1986, Modern  Investment  Management and the Prudent Man Rule (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
Luhmann, N.: 1995, Social Systems (Stanford University Press, Palo Alto). 
Macey, J.: 1991, ‘An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive 
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties’, Stetson Law Review 21, 23–55. 
Marjorie, K.: 2001, The Divine Right of Capital: Dethroning the Corporate Aristocracy (Berrett-Koehler, San Francisco). 
Marris, R. and D. C. Mueller: 1980, ‘The Corporation, Competition and the Invisible Hand’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 18, 32–63. 
McGeachie, S., M. Kiernan and E. Kirzner: 2005, Finance 
and the Environment in North America: The State of Play of the Integration of Environmental Issues into Financial Research 
(Environment Canada, Ottawa). 
McMurtry, J.: 1998, The Cancer Stage of Capitalism (Pluto Press, London). 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment Board (MEAB): 2005, 
Living Beyond Our Means: Natural Assets and Human Well-Being. Statement from the Board (MEAB). 
Moodie, D. W. and J. C. Lehr: 2008, ‘Macro-Historical Geography and the Great Chartered Companies: The Case 
of the Hudson’s Bay Company’, Canadian Geographer 25(2), 267–271. 
Parliament of Ireland, Select Committee on Finance and the Public Service: 2006, Parliamentary Debates (February 
23), p. 44. 
Purcell, N.: 2007; Remarks, UNEPFI Global Roundtable, Melbourne, October 24–25. 
Quarter, J., L. Mook and B. Richmond: 2003, What 
Counts: Social Accounting for Nonprofits and Cooperatives 
 
 
(Prentice Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ). 
Redgwell, C. J.: 1997, ‘Privatisation and Environmental Regulation: Some General Observations’, Journal of Energy 
and Natural Resources Law 15, 34–40. 
Richardson, B. J.: 2006, ‘Financing Environmental Sustainability: A New Role for the Law’, in S. Benn and 
D. Dunphy (eds.), Corporate Governance and Sustainability: Challenges for Theory and Practice (Routledge, London), 
pp. 122–142. 
Richardson, B. J.: 2007, ‘Financing Sustainability: The New Transnational Governance of Socially Responsible 
Investment’, in Yearbook of International Environmental Law (Oxford University Press, New York), pp. 73–110. 
Richardson, B. J.: 2008, Socially Responsible Investment Law: Regulating the Unseen Polluters (Oxford University Press, New 
York). 
Sarra, J.: 2003, ‘The Corporation as Symphony: Are Shareholders First Violin or Second Fiddle?’, UBC Law 
Review 36, 403–441. 
Sassen,  S.:  1996,  Losing  Control?  Sovereignty   in   the Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, New York). 
Slapper,  G.  and  S.  Tombs:  1999,  Corporate  Crime 
(Longman, Harlow, UK). 
Soros, G.: 2008, The New Paradigm for Financial Markets: The Credit Crisis of 2008 and What It Means (Public Affairs, 
New York). 
Soskolne, C. (ed.): 2007, Sustaining Life on Earth (Lexington Books, New York). 
Stewart, R. B.: 2001, ‘A New Generation of Environmental Regulation?’, Capital University Law Review 29, 21–182. 
Stout, L.: 2002, ‘Lecture and Commentary on the Social Responsibility of Corporate Entities: Bad and NotSo-Bad 
Arguments for Shareholder Primacy’, Southern California Law Review 75, 189. 
Sunstein, C. R.: 1990, ‘Paradoxes of the Regulatory State’, University of Chicago Law Review 57, 407–441. 
Sunstein, C. R.: 1991, ‘Administrative Substance’, Duke Law Journal 3, 607–646. 
Teubner, G.: 1987, Juridification of Social Spheres (Walter de Gruyter, Berlin). 
Teubner, G.: 1998, ‘Juridification: Concepts, Aspects, Limits, Solutions’, in R. Baldwin, C. Scott and C. Hood 
(eds.), A Reader on Regulation (Oxford University Press, Oxford), pp. 389–410. 
Thornton, R.: 2008, ‘Ethical Investments: A Case of Disjointed Thinking’, Cambridge Law Journal 67, 396– 422. 
Triolo, P., M. Palmer and S. Waygood: 2000, A Capital 
Solution: Faith, Finance and Concern for a Living Planet 
(Pilkington Press, London). 
Troyer, T., W. Slocombe and R. Boisture: 1985, ‘Divestment of South Africa Investments: The Legal Implications 
for Foundations, Other Charitable Institutions, and Pension Funds’, Georgetown Law Journal 74, 127–161. 
Trucost: 2007, Carbon Counts 2007: The Carbon Footprint Ranking of UK Investment (Trucost, London). 
Unerman, J., J. Bebbington and B. O’Dwyer (eds.): 2007, Sustainability Accounting and Accountability (Routledge, New 
York). 
Union of Concerned Scientists: 1992, ‘World Scientists’ Warning to Humanity’, http://www.ucsusa.org/ucs/ 
about/1992-world-scientists-warning-to-humanity. html. 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP): 2004,  Use  of  Economic   Instruments   in   Environmental Policy: 
Opportunities and Challenges (UNEP, Nairobi). 
United Nations Environment Program Finance Initiative 
(UNEPFI): 2004a, The Materiality of Social, Environmental and Corporate Governance Issues in Equity Pricing (UNEPFI, 
Geneva). 
UNEPFI: 2004b, Generation Lost: Young Financial Analysts and Environmental, Social and Governance Issues. Executive Summary 
(UNEPFI, Geneva). 
UNEPFI: 2006, Show Me the Money: Linking Environmental, Social and Governance Issues to Company Value (UNEPFI, 
Geneva). 
UNEPFI: 2007, Responsible Investment in Focus: How Leading Public Pension Funds are Meeting the Challenge (UNEPFI, 
Geneva). 
UNEPFI: 2009, Fiduciary Responsibility. Legal and Practical Aspects of Integrating Environmental, Social and Governance Issues 
into Institutional Investment (UNEPFI, Geneva). 
Watt, G.: 2006Trusts and Equity, 2nd Edition (Oxford University Press, Oxford). 
Watts, P.: 2009, Directors’ Powers and Duties (LexisNexis, Wellington). 
Waygood, S.: 2006, Capital Market Campaigning (Risk Books, London). 
Williams, C. and J. Conley: 2007, ‘Triumph or Tragedy: The Curious Path of Corporate Disclosure Reform in the 
UK’, William and Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 31(2), 317–361. 
 
 
Wolf, R. M.: 2001, ‘Will the Nation-State Survive Globalization?’, Foreign Affairs 80(1), 178–190. 
Wood, S.: 2006, ‘Voluntary Environmental Codes and Sustainability’, in B. J. Richardson and S. Wood (eds.), 
Environmental Law for Sustainability (Hart Publishing, Oxford), pp. 229–276. 
World Economic Forum (WEF): 2005, Mainstreaming Responsible Investment (WEF, Geneva). 
Yeager, P. C.: 1991, The Limits of Law: The Public Regulation of Private Pollution (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge). 
 
Benjamin J. Richardson Osgoode Hall Law School, 
York University, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON M3J 1P3, Canada 
E-mail: BRichardson@osgoode.yorku.ca 
 
Wes Cragg Schulich School of Business, 
York University, Toronto, ON, Canada 
